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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. Missouri Flat Neither Waived Its Arguments of Contract Construction Nor 
Conceded that the Indenture Expressly Conveyed Only an Easement. 
The one thing that Missouri Flat and Gold Mountain seem to agree on is that the 
Indenture should be construed according to ordinary rules of contract construction. [See, 
Appellee's Brief, at p. 11.] The first rule to be applied in interpreting the deed is that the 
court should "give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the deed as a whole." 
Hanockv. Planned Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990). [See also, 
Appellee's Brief, at 11.] Missouri Flat and Gold Mountain each vigorously assert that, if 
all of the language is considered and made meaningful, it is apparent that its interpretation 
is correct as a matter of law. Of course, it cannot be apparent from the face of the 
Indenture both that the surface was conveyed in fee and that only an easement was 
granted. Although each party urged a resolution of the matter based upon the wholesale 
adoption of its interpretation of the Indenture, there were actually three issues before the 
trial court and now before this Court. First, does the language used in the Indenture 
support, as a matter of law, Missouri Flat's position that the surface was granted to it's 
predecessor in fee? Second, is Gold Mountain correct that the Indenture unambiguously 
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created only an easement for grazing and agricultural purposes? Third, if when read in its 
entirety the Indenture is not clear as to the intent of the parties, what interest should be 
deemed to have been conveyed? Although Missouri Flat and Gold Mountain each argued 
that the language of the deed, when considered in total, supported its client's position as 
to the interest conveyed, neither conceded that the other's position was apparent from that 
same language. Indeed, the very portions of the Indenture that support Missouri Flat's 
argument that the surface was conveyed in fee, refute Gold Mountain's position that the 
creation of an easement is apparent. Moreover, in considering the matter de novo, this 
Court should not disregard either the conflicting language in the Indenture or the rules of 
deed construction. 
Likewise, there is nothing in the transcript of the post-hearing, telephonic 
conference with the trial court, that supports a finding that either party conceded the 
other's position was obvious from the face of the document. The trial court had before it 
numerous briefs and affidavits filed by Gold Mountain and Missouri Flat that argued for 
diametrically opposed interpretations of the Indenture. [See, R. 322-332; 333-335; 336-
339; 340-342; 343-364; 365-366; 367-376; 379-378; 379-396; 399-405; 406-409; 442-
444; 472-486; 487-602; 603-637; 638-640; 641-644; 645-658; 659-777; 778-789.] After 
the extensive briefing was completed, the trial court held oral argument on the pending 
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motions for summary judgment against Missouri Flat. [See, R. 798]. The transcript of the 
actual argument on the summary judgment motions was not made a part of the record. 
[See, R. 831-833] After the hearing, the trial court scheduled a telephonic conference to 
address the court's questions and his notes, which were attached to the Notice of Hearing. 
[See, R. 799-802] Thus, by the time of the telephonic hearing the matter had been 
extensively briefed and argued to the trial court. Consequently, the trial court also knew 
that Missouri Flat vehemently disagreed with Gold Mountain's interpretation of the 
Indenture. There is nothing in any of the memoranda filed with the trial court to suggest 
that Missouri Flat ever conceded that, if the trial court did not find that the deed conveyed 
the surface in fee, it must find that it unambiguously conveyed only an easement. 
Likewise, Gold Mountain never conceded that if its position did not prevail, the court 
must find a conveyance of fee simple from the face of the document. In arguing for their 
respective positions, each party highlighted the portions of the Indenture that it believed 
weighed in favor of an interpretation favorable to its position, thereby calling the court's 
attention to those that conflicted with a finding for the opposition. The trial court was 
always free to find that portions of the Indenture conflicted and that the intent of the 
grantor was not clear from the face of the document. Nothing that happened during the 
subsequent telephone conference changed that. 
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The purpose of the telephone call was to allow the trial court to "get back together 
with both of you and ask my questions and see if you could give me some more help." [R. 
843, at p. 5.] The court then raised a number of specific questions that counsel for the 
parties were asked to address. During the telephonic conference, counsel for Missouri 
Flat continued to argue that language of the Indenture supported a finding that the deed 
conveyed the surface in fee simple. [R. 843, at 16-20.] After both parties reiterated their 
positions that the Indenture if read properly supported their client's position, the trial 
court stated the language quoted by Gold Mountain that neither party was offering "any 
extraneous evidence about the intention of the parties." [R. 843, at 20.] The trial court 
also stated that the parties were asking him to "look at the deed and try and determine 
what the intents of the parties was within the four corners of the document." [R. 843, at 
20.] Counsel for Missouri Flat responded that he did not "know if extrinsic evidence 
would be admissible to show what the parties meant. But I don't know that we could find 
anybody to tell us what they thought." [R. 843, at pp. 20-21.] That statement simply 
acknowledges that, as was argued in the briefs on laches and estoppel already before the 
court, no one was still alive who could provide testimony about what was intended. [See, 
659-777, at p. 10.] There is nothing about counsel's response that prevented the trial 
court from concluding that neither Missouri Flat's nor Gold Mountain's position was 
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clear from the document. Likewise, counsel for Missouri Flat never conceded that if it 
did not prevail, the Indenture must unambiguously grant only an easement. The trial 
court was asked to review the entire document and "try [to] determine" the intent of the 
grantor. If that intent was not apparent, the court should have applied additional rules of 
construction to resolve the issue. 
Missouri Flat continues to assert that a careful review of the language of the 
Indenture supports a finding that it conveyed the surface in fee to Missouri Flat's 
predecessor. If, however, this Court does not agree, the language highlighted by Missouri 
Flat renders the deed at least ambiguous. If the meaning of the grantor is unclear, a 
finding of a conveyance in fee is favored and any ambiguity should be resolved in favor 
of the grantee. 
B. The Indenture Supports A Finding that The Surface was Conveyed in Fee. 
1. The "As I f Language Shows Expressly that Fee to the Surface Was 
Conveyed. 
The Indenture states that the grantor reserves the right to continue to use "the 
surface hereby conveyed" in connection with the grantor's mining activities "as fully and 
entirely as if said First Party [Gold Mountain's Predecessor] . . . remained the owner in 
fee simple of said surface." [Indenture, at p. 2-3 (emphasis added), attached as Exhibit 1 
5 
to Appellant's Brief.] This language alone is enough to find error in the trial court's 
ruling that the Indenture clearly and unambiguously granted only an easement. Gold 
Mountain argues that the Indenture gave Missouri Flat's predecessor an easement but 
retained to the grantor the fee of the surface. If that were the case, Gold Mountain's 
predecessor would "in fact" remain the owner in fee of the surface. Yet, it is obvious 
from the "as i f language quoted above that this was not the case. The words "as i f 
suggest a hypothetical situation that is different than what actually exists. This language 
simply cannot be reconciled with a finding that the grantor retained the surface in fee. 
Gold Mountain asks this Court to ignore the obvious import of this language and 
instead adopt the trial court's position that the "as i f language was simply an attempt to 
allow the grantor the "broadest possible right to use the surface." [See, Appellee's Brief, 
at p. 20.] That analysis, however, ignores the way in which the grantor sought to preserve 
that right. The Indenture did not state that the grantor could continue to use the surface 
because he remained the owner in fee of the surface. Rather, it expressly states that he 
should be given rights to the surface in connection with his mining activities "as i f he 
remained the owner in fee of the surface. It is apparent from the words used that the 
grantor understood that, after this conveyance to Missouri Flat's predecessor, he would no 
longer "actually" be the owner in fee of said surface. 
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Missouri Flat does not disagree that the grantor wanted to retain very broad rights 
to use the surface in connection with its mining activities. Likewise, Missouri Flat does 
not dispute the cases and authorities cited by Gold Mountain which state that ownership 
in fee simple provides the "greatest possible aggregate of rights." [See, Appellee Brief, at 
p. 20.] The intent of the grantor to retain broad rights to use the surface for mining does 
not change the acknowledgment in the document itself that the grantor understood that he 
no longer owned the surface in fee. The document states that the grantor may continue to 
use the surface in connection with its mining activities "as fully and entirely as i f it 
"remained the owner in fee simple of said surface." The use of the words "as i f would 
make no sense if the grantor continued to own the surface in fee. It is only in the context 
of a severance of the surface in fee from the mineral estate in fee that the hypothetical 
statement gives meaning to the document. Although the grantor had conveyed the surface 
in fee, he retained the broadest possible rights to use that surface in connection with the 
activities enumerated in the same paragraph. Those activities include intrusions on the 
surface to facilitate the mining activities anticipated in connection with the use of the 
mineral estate which the grantor did retain in fee. Contrary to Gold Mountain's 
suggestions, there is no way to harmonize the "as i f language with its position that the 
grantor retained the surface in fee. 
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This language alone is sufficient to establish that the Indenture conveyed the 
surface in fee to Missouri Flat's predecessor. At the very least, however, it makes the 
grant ambiguous. There is no way to neutralize the "as i f language to support the trial 
court's decision that the Indenture unambiguously conveyed only an easement. Thus, the 
trial court must be reversed. 
2. The Decision ofHaynes v. Hunt is Not Inconsistent With A Finding 
that the Indenture Conveyed the Surface in Fee. 
Gold Mountain relies primarily on the 1939 decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Haynes v. Hunt 85 P.2d 861 (Utah 1939). That case, like every other decision 
interpreting a deed in Utah, starts from the premise that the intent of the grantor should be 
determined by considering the "whole deed and every part thereof." 85 P.2d at 863. If 
the deed under consideration had provisions like those in this case, it is likely that the 
result would have been different. For example, there was no statement in the deed to 
Hunt that the grantor could continue to use the lakes and lake front property as if the 
grantor retained fee simple in that property. Likewise, unlike the Indenture here, there 
was not a house included in the grant to Hunt. In that case, based upon the actual 
language of the deed and the written contract which explained the "fishing privilege" in 
more detail, the Court concluded that an easement had been conveyed. There is nothing 
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about the Haynes decision that suggests this Court should ignore all other provisions of 
the Indenture and focus only on the provision which describes the intended use of the 
property by the grantee. The Haynes Court recognized that the paramount rule of deed 
construction was to consider the entire document. 85 P.2d at 863. 
Moreover, in the 65 years that have passed since Haynes was decided, many courts 
have recognized that language addressing the use of the property may be merely 
descriptive of the intended purpose and not intended to limit the grant. See, Appellant's 
Brief, at pp. 12-13. Although decisions from other jurisdictions are not binding on this 
Court, they are helpful. If the reference to grazing and agricultural purposes is read as a 
description of the intended use by the grantee under the Indenture, the remaining 
provisions can all be harmonized. The grant of the surface in fee would make the "as if5 
provision consistent with the fact that the grantor had not retained title to the surface in 
fee. Indeed, the detailed description of the type of activities in which the grantor could 
continue to engage on the surface, including the limitations of the grantor's liability for 
damage to the surface, would be essential because of the change in ownership of the 
surface. 
Furthermore, Missouri Flat agrees with Gold Mountain that the decisions 
concerning whether a statement of the intended use is a limitation of the grant or merely 
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descriptive is dependant on a case by case analysis. [See, Appellee's Brief, at p. 27.] The 
Haynes case does not stand for the proposition, as Gold Mountain seems to suggest, that 
every deed describing the grantee's anticipated use automatically creates an easement 
regardless of what other provisions are contained in that document. 
In this case, a finding that the surface was served from the mineral estate and 
conveyed to the grantor in fee simple, subject to the grantor's use in connection with its 
mining activities, is supported by the language of the Indenture taken as a whole. Gold 
Mountain concedes that but for the descriptive language, the words of grant and the use 
of specific legal descriptions support a conveyance in fee. [See, Appellee's Brief at pp. 16 
& 25.] Likewise, even the trial court found that an easement in a house for grazing 
purposes made no sense and thus "the grantor must have wanted to give the grantees the 
exclusive use and control of it." [R. 818-30, at p. 4, f 9.] Therefore, the trial court 
interpreted the exact same grant language as conveying one of the described properties 
listed in fee simple, but only an easement over the rest. [R. 804-08, at p. 3.] There is 
simply no way to support a finding of an unambiguous intent of the grantor to make such 
distinctions about the property described in the Indenture. 
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C. If a Grant in Fee Simple is Not Apparent, the Indenture is Ambiguous and 
Must be Interpreted Against the Grantor and in Favor of a Conveyance in 
Fee Simple. 
The Utah legislature has codified a preference for conveyances in fee simple: 
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real 
estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-3. Gold Mountain argues that because all parties agree that only 
a part of the real property owned, the surface, was conveyed this statute is inapplicable. 
[See, Appellee's Brief, at p. 29.] The statute is not concerned with the boundaries of the 
legal description of the real property conveyed, but rather with the "title" granted. An 
easement is a lesser estate than title in fee simple. If the trial court was in error when it 
concluded that the grantor's intent to convey only an easement was obvious from the 
Indenture, the intent is ambiguous. Under that scenario, Utah law presumes that the 
grantor intended to convey title in fee simple absolute. 
In addition, the Utah courts recognize that where the intent of the parties is 
unclear, the deed should be interpreted "most strongly against the grantor, and most 
favorably to the grantee." Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351, 585 (Utah 1952).1 Gold 
Although Gold Mountain questions whether the Wood Court actually applied this 
rule, the Court certainly cited it favorably. [See, Appellee's Brief, at 24. Moreover, 
although the exact language of the deed under consideration was not quoted in the 
decision, the parties and the court were in agreement that the conveyance to Wood was 
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Mountain argues against the application of this rule on the ground that the deed is not 
rendered ambiguous simply because the parties disagree on its meaning. [See, Appellee's 
Brief, at p. 31.] Missouri Flat does not suggest otherwise. In this case, however, the 
provisions highlighted by Missouri Flat either support a conveyance of the surface in fee 
or, at the very least, make the intent of the grantor unclear. The trial court's ruling, which 
found an intent to grant one of the described properties in fee and convey only an 
easement over the rest, shows that it too found portions of the document in conflict. 
Under these circumstances, application of the rule interpreting the Indenture against the 
grantor is applicable. Haynes does not hold otherwise: "When the intention of the parties 
to a deed or contract can be ascertained from it" arbitrary rules of law will not be invoked. 
85 P.2d at 863. If the intent cannot be ascertained from the document alone, other rules 
must be applied to determine the effect of the deed. 
If the Court does not find the "as i f language and other provisions indicative of an 
intent to convey the surface in fee, it should find the document unclear in ascertaining that 
intent. If the grantor's intent is not evident from the face of the document, a presumption 
in favor of a conveyance in fee should be applied and the Indenture should be interpreted 
against the grantor. Thus, the trial court's decision should be reversed and judgment 
for water gathering purposes but that the conveyance was in fee. 253 P.2d at 585. 
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entered finding that the surface was conveyed in fee simple to Missouri Flat's 
predecessor. 
D. Missouri Flat Did Not Waive its Claims of Laches, Estoppel and Adverse 
Possession. 
Gold Mountain cannot have it both ways. Either it drafted the order implementing 
the trial court's decision in good faith to reflect accurately what was decided or it tried to 
lull counsel for Missouri Flat and the trial court into adopting an order that did not 
correctly reflect the ruling. Despite Gold Mountain's arguments before this Court, 
Missouri Flat believes it was the former. Both counsel agreed on an order that reflected 
the trial court's intent to decide all of the issues pending in the summary judgment 
motions before it. Those memoranda included Missouri Flat's arguments on laches, 
estoppel, and adverse possession. [R. 603-637; 638-640; 641-644; 659-777; 778-789.] 
The decision on the motions for summary judgment found that Missouri Flat had fee 
simple title to the house and the real property on which it stood, but only an easement in 
the other described parcels. [R. 804-808, at p. 3] To reach that conclusion, the trial court 
necessarily had to reject Missouri Flat's claims of estoppel, laches, and adverse 
possession. Consequently, when counsel for Gold Mountain prepared the order he 
included conclusions of law finding against Missouri Flat on those issues. [R. 818-830, at 
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pp. 3 & 5.] The trial court reviewed the order and entered it. The trial court would not 
have done so if it had not intended to resolve the laches, estoppel, and adverse possession 
issues that were pending in the summary judgment motions decided by the order. 
Gold Mountain now argues that it included these issues in the order because it 
assumed Missouri Flat had abandoned those claims. [See, Appellee's Brief, at p. 35.] 
Apparently, this belief arose from the post-hearing telephone conference. After the 
parties had addressed the questions raised by the trial court in the first twenty-three pages 
of the transcript, the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Russell, what else did you want to talk about today? 
Mr. RUSSELL: I think that about covers it, probably. 
[R. 843, at p. 24.] At that point the court and counsel said goodbye and ended the 
telephone conference. There is nothing about counsel for Missouri Flat's response that 
communicated an intent to waive the claims for estoppel, laches, and adverse possession 
that had been briefed and were pending before the court. Furthermore, if that is what 
Gold Mountain truly believed, it could easily have prepared the order indicating that 
Missouri Flat had abandoned these claims. It did not do so. Instead, the order contains 
"Conclusions of Law" which state: 
3. Gold Mountain's claims against Missouri Flat in this matter are not barred 
by laches or estoppel.... 
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11. Missouri Flat has not established any rights or title in the Subject Property 
beyond the rights granted by the Indenture by adverse possession. 
[R. 818-830, at pp. 3 & 5.] Likewise, if the trial court believed that counsel for Missouri 
Flat had waived these claims, it could have struck the conclusions or modified the order. 
The court did neither; it entered the order as written thereby ruling on the claims for 
laches, estoppel and adverse possession. 
Gold Mountain's position that Missouri Flat waived these claims is not supported 
by the record or the case law. None of the decisions cited by Gold Mountain finds that an 
issue properly briefed in a memoranda filed with the trial court is waived if not repeated 
at the hearing on that motion. [See, Appellee's Brief, at pp. 32-33.] In Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998), the issue was whether the shareholders of 
an irrigation company had properly exhausted their administrative remedies by raising the 
relevant issue before the State Engineer. 966 P.2d at 847. Because the plaintiffs did not 
raise the particular issue "either during the hearing or through their written protests," the 
Utah Supreme Court found it had not been properly preserved. Id (emphasis added). 
The facts in Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) are equally 
inapplicable. The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the plaintiff had 
properly preserved a request for written questions to be answered by prospective jurors. 
15 
The Broberg Court found that "[t]he record on appeal does not show how, in what 
context, or even whether the written questions were brought to the trial court's attention 
at the time of voir dire of the potential jurors." 782 P.2d at 201. Consequently, because 
no objection was made before the jury was empaneled or even during trial, the issue was 
not preserved. 
In Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the 
issue was whether an objection to a jury instruction on the grounds that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the claim was sufficient to put the trial court on notice 
that the defendant contended it owed no duty to the plaintiff. 945 P.2d at 130-31. Other 
than this vague objection to the jury instruction, the "record [did] not reflect any other 
attempt by the County to preserve this issue for appeal." 945 P.2d at 131. 
In none of these cases, did the court hold that when a party presents an argument in 
a brief submitted in opposition to or in support of a motion for summary judgment, that 
party must also raise the argument at the hearing on the motion or it is waived. Such a 
rule would be contrary to the purpose of oral argument, which is to supplement the brief 
and address questions of the court. The claims of laches, estoppel, and adverse 
possession were expressly included in the memoranda filed with the trial court. [R. 659-
777.] Indeed, Gold Mountain admits that Missouri Flat argued these issues below. [See, 
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Appellee's Brief, at p. 36 (quoting Missouri Flat's Supplementary Memorandum on 
Adverse Possession).] It would make for very tedious motion practice, if every issue 
raised in the briefs was waived if not specifically reargued orally. Indeed, trial courts 
rarely have the patience or the time to listen to counsel reiterate everything in his or her 
brief. Gold Mountain can point to no authority for this position and it is contrary to the 
order actually entered by the trial court. 
Furthermore, Gold Mountain's argument that Missouri Flat waived these claims by 
inference at the end of the post-briefing, post-hearing, telephone conference scheduled by 
the trial court to address its specific questions is absurd. Under Gold Mountain's theory 
not only are arguments and claims asserted in a summary judgment memorandum 
forfeited if not reargued orally, they can also be waived by politely responding in the 
negative when in a post-argument telephone conversation the trial judge asks if there is 
anything else to discuss. 
E. Summary Judgment was Improper on the Claim of Adverse Possession. 
To prevail on a claim for adverse possession, Missouri Flat must establish that: 1) 
it occupied the property continuously for seven years; 2) paid the taxes levied and 
assessed; 3) and put the property to the ordinary use of the occupant. Salt Lake County v. 
Metro Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 Utah 23, at % 22, 89 P.3d 155, 160 (Utah). The third 
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requirement is often referred to as a showing that possession was adverse. The Utah 
Legislature has determined that whenever the adverse possession claimant "or those 
under whom he claims" entered the property under claim of title based upon a written 
instrument, the property "is deemed to have been held adversely." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-12-8. Gold Mountain argues that Missouri Flat cannot meet the seven year 
requirement because the Trustee's Deed to Missouri Flat is dated July 19, 1994. [See, 
Appellee's Brief, at p. 39.] That argument ignores the right of Missouri Flat to tack 
possession. 
Missouri Flat's predecessor "under whom it claims," also took the surface of the 
property under color of title. The Warranty Deed dated December 15, 1987 "grants and 
conveys" to Missouri Flat's predecessor, "the following described tracts of land in Sevier 
County, State of Utah." [R. 761-765, at p. 1.] The Warranty Deed contains no limitation 
on or description of the use of the property and no suggestion that only an easement is 
being conveyed. Thus, Missouri Flat's predecessor took under color of title. Missouri 
Flat is entitled to tack the time the surface was occupied by its predecessor with the time 
it occupied the surface. See, e.g, Royal Street Land Co, v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 
(Utah 1987) (tacking of successive periods allowed to meet seven-year adverse 
possession requirement); Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
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("Under the doctrine of tacking, the seven-year period of possession may be completed by 
one possessor or by a series of possessors in privity with each other.") (citations omitted). 
The prior Warranty Deed was executed in 1987 and the Trustee's Deed under which 
Missouri Flat took title was dated 1994. Tacking these periods together more than meets 
the seven-year period of possession required to establish adverse possession. 
Because possession under color of title is deemed adverse, Missouri Flat need only 
prove the payment of taxes to satisfy the requirements of adverse possession. Missouri 
Flat paid all of the taxes assessed for surface use unrelated to mining and has therefore 
also met that burden. See, Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Utah 
1987). If this Court disagrees that the issue on taxes can be resolved as a matter of law in 
favor of Missouri Flat, however, both parties agree this material issue of fact is contested. 
[See, Appellee's Brief, at p. 9.] Consequently, it was error for the trial court to grant 
summary judgment against Missouri Flat on its adverse possession claim. 
F. The Trial Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on Missouri Flat's 
Claims of Estoppel and Laches. 
Gold Mountain waited fifty years to pursue its quiet title action. The witnesses 
that could have testified about the original Indenture are no longer available, the property 
has increased in value, and subsequent deeds have contained no restrictions on the use of 
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the surface. Missouri Flat has been disadvantaged by these events. It cannot obtain 
relevant testimony to defend against Gold Mountain's belated claims and it has purchased 
the property and paid the taxes with the understandable belief that it holds title to the 
surface in fee. Similar facts have supported implementation of the doctrine of laches and 
estoppel by the Utah courts. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158-59 (Utah 
1976) (death of relevant witness during the eight years party delayed in bringing claim 
supported a finding of laches); Ruthraujfv. Silver King Western Mining & Milling Co., 80 
P.2d 338, 347 (Utah 1938) (death of relevant witnesses and faded memory of others 
during a delay of eighteen years supported a finding of laches). Although Gold Mountain 
dismisses the relevance of these events, there has been a real impact on Missouri Flat. If 
the original grantor and grantee were still available, their testimony could be extremely 
helpful in harmonizing the language of the Indenture with the subsequent behavior of the 
parties. 
Once again, Gold Mountain suggests that counsel for Missouri Flat waived all of 
its arguments and theories during the telephone conference scheduled to address the trial 
court's post-hearing questions on the summary judgment motions. Gold Mountain argues 
that Missouri Flat must have intended to abandon its laches, estoppel, and adverse 
possession claims because it did not raise them during the telephone conference. [See, 
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Appellee's Brief, at 32-34.] At the time of the telephone conference, the trial court had 
before it two separately briefed motions for summary judgment. The first was on the 
issue of the interpretation of the Indenture. [R. 322-332; 333-335; 336-339, 340-342; 343-
364; 365-366; 367-376.] The second motion for summary judgement was directed 
specifically to the claims of laches, estoppel, and adverse possession that had been added 
by Missouri Flat's Amended Complaint. [R. 424-428; 445-446; 603-637; 638-640; 641-
644; 645-658; 659-777; 778-789.] Missouri Flat expressly argued in its memoranda that 
issues of fact precluded summary judgment on its adverse possession claim. [R. 659-777, 
at pp. 6-9.] It also provided legal analysis and argument opposing summary judgment in 
favor of Gold Mountain on the claims for laches and estoppel. [R. 659-777, at pp. 9-11.] 
For example, Missouri Flat stated: 
Plaintiff [Gold Mountain] and its predecessors have waited since 1951 to institute 
an action seeking a determination that Missouri Flat and its predecessors have 
owned nothing more than an easement in the surface estate in spite of the plain 
language of the Indenture and subsequent conveyances which establish that fee 
title to the surface estate was conveyed. During that period of time, Missouri Flat 
and its predecessors have possessed the property, paid all taxes, executed trust 
deeds, and otherwise acted in accordance with ownership of fee title to the surface 
estate. [See Statement of Disputed Material Facts f 13.] Now, 50 years later, 
plaintiff asserts for the first time that Missouri Flat and its predecessors have only 
owned an easement in the surface. Missouri Flat is substantially prejudiced by 
such delay in that all of the parties to the Indenture who could provide information 
and testify regarding the intent of the language, are now deceased or cannot be 
found. 
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[R. 659-777, at p. 9.] These issues and claims and the relevance of subsequent conduct 
were squarely before the trial court. Missouri Flat never waived these claims, and the 
trial court actually entered an order which included findings and conclusions on laches, 
estoppel, and adverse possession. Despite Gold Mountain's repeated arguments to the 
contrary, these issues are properly before this Court. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The 1951 Indenture is a confusing and old document. If it is read as an attempt to 
sever the surface estate in fee from the mineral estate in fee, it is consistent with many 
other deeds which contain mineral reservations to the grantor. That interpretation also 
gives meaning to the grantor's express reservation of the right to continue to use the 
surface in connection with mining activities "as i f he retained ownership in fee of the 
surface. Under this analysis, the references to the use of the surface for grazing and 
agricultural purposes can be harmonized as a description but not a limitation on the use 
that was anticipated at the time. Such a reading of the deed not only makes sense of the 
express limitations on the grantor's liability for injury to the surface, it also explains the 
conveyance of the house. When taken as a whole, the Indenture can be read as a 
conveyance in fee of the surface. That interpretation also is consistent with the behavior 
of the parties, including the use of the surface as security for loans, and the exclusion of 
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any reference to the intended use of the surface in subsequent deeds. Thus, the trial 
court's decision should be reversed and an order entered finding that Missouri Flat owns 
the surface in fee. 
If this Court cannot ascertain from the Indenture that a conveyance in fee was 
intended, the document is ambiguous. The grantor's own acknowledgment that he did not 
actually own the surface in fee in the "as i f clause, together with other portions of the 
Indenture make a finding of a conveyance of no more than an easement highly 
questionable. Thus, the Court should resolve the uncertainties against the grantor and in 
favor of transfer of the surface in fee simple absolute. 
Even if the deed could be found to unequivocally grant only an easement, Missouri 
Flat and its predecessors have obtained title in fee to the surface by adverse possession. 
The deed to Missouri Flat and that to its predecessor contain no limitations on the use of 
the surface. Thus, these parties took possession under color of title. By Utah law, that 
possession is deemed to be adverse. Together they have occupied the surface adversely 
for over seven years. Moreover, the taxes on the surface not associated with mining 
activities have been paid by Missouri Flat and its predecessors. Thus, the trial court was 
in error when it granted summary judgment in favor of Gold Mountain on Missouri Flat's 
adverse possession claim. 
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Finally, Gold Mountain has waited much too long to bring this action. During the 
last fifty years the surface has been conveyed to good faith purchasers like Missouri Flat 
with no indication that only an easement was being granted. Furthermore, the critical 
witnesses who could explain the conflicting provisions of the Indenture have passed 
away. Gold Mountain's claim to the fee estate in the surface is, therefore, barred by 
laches and estoppel. 
For all of these reasons, Missouri Flat respectfully requests that the decision of the 
trial court be reversed and judgment be entered in favor of Missouri Flat. 
DATED this M#l day of December, 2004. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
B y : _ ^ 
CarcSfyn B. McHugh° 
Ronald G. Russell 
Attorneys for Missouri Flat 
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